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11 Introduction
The development of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (hereafter, FTPL) has re-
newed interest for the theoretical determination of the price level. The FTPL links
price determination to the government present value budget constraint, i.e. the equal-
ity of the public debt expressed in real terms with the present discounted value of
future expected primary surpluses. The key intuition of the FTPL is that, if current
and future ﬁscal policies are set without concern for sustainability, the general price
level might jump in order to fulﬁll the present value budget constraint.
There have been few attempts to test this theory on empirical grounds, in part
because of its reliance on future events. A notable exception is Canzoneri et al.
(2001), who use the VAR methodology to assess the FTPL. They show using US
data that positive shocks to the primary surplus provoke a fall in the public debt to
GDP ratio, which they interpret as rejection of the FTPL.
Their methodology was quite severely criticised by Cochrane (1998) who argued
that their results may in fact be consistent with the prevalence of a FTPL regime.
Basing upon the distinction between the cyclical and structural components of the
primary surplus, Cochrane demonstrates theoretically that a negative correlation be-
tween the innovations of both components can produce with impulse reaction func-
tions of the form given in Canzoneri et al. (2001), even though the FTPL prevails.
Although Canzoneri et al. (2001) acknowledge Cochrane’s critique, they perform
only a limited investigation on this point.
This paper proposes two extensions to the empirics of the FTPL. First, we apply
Canzoneri et al. (2001)’s methodology to the case of France. Empirical analysis for the
USA is reported to serve as a benchmark. Second, we incorporate structural balance
data into the analysis in order to gain some immunity from Cochrane’s critique. We
investigate whether, assuming a FTPL regime, the joint structural and cyclical deﬁcit
process is able to produce empirical impulse response functions that would lead to
apparent rejection of the FTPL. Unlike Canzoneri et al (2001), we furthermore allow
for lagged cross-correlations between both components of the primary surplus.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second section reviews the
macroeconomic implications of the FTPL and the diﬀerent empirical tests which have
been used so far in the literature to invalidate it. The controversy between Canzoneri
et al. (2001) and Cochrane (1998) is discussed. The data and methodology used
2in the paper are presented in the third section. The fourth section is devoted to
our empirical results. The main ﬁndings are twofold: ﬁrst, using the methodology
of Canzoneri et al., the FTPL must be rejected in the case of France also; second
including structural ﬁscal data to account for Cochrane’s insights, does not provide
support to a FTPL interpretation of the data.
2 Testing the FTPL
2 . 1 T h eF T P L :a no v e r v i e w
The FTPL emphasises that the price level is able to ’jump’ in relation to the gov-
ernment present value budget constraint.This theory states that the government can
exogenously set its real spending and revenue plans, and that the price level will take
on the value required to adjust the real value of its contractual nominal debt obli-
gations to ensure government solvency. Unlike in the process developed by Sargent
and Wallace (1981), the mechanism underlying the FTPL, while directly linked to
the present value budget constraint, does not hinge on the variation of the monetary
aggregates and the monetisation of public debt.
Consider the government ﬂow budget identity:
Bt+1 =( 1+it)Bt − St+1 (1)
where Bt is public debt at the end of period t, it is the return on public debt, St is
the net surplus.
This condition can be formulated in terms of GDP shares as:
bt+1 = rtbt − st+1 (2)
where bt = Bt
ptyt and rt=(1 + it) PtYt
Pt+1Yt+1, with pt the price level and yt real GDP.
Thus, (rt − 1)is approximately the growth corrected real interest rate. For con-
venience, we assume the expected real rate to be constant, equal to r. The ﬂow








3Equation (3) is an accounting identity. Ex post, it should hold for whatever
value of the interest rate, the primary surplus or nominal income. Now, government
solvency is ensured if the last term on the RHS of equation (3) tends to zero when
k tends to the inﬁnity. This transversality condition ensures that the public debt to
GDP ratio does not increase by more than the gap between the interest rate and the







The main outcome of the FTPL is in stating that there are two diﬀerent ex ante
mechanisms which enable the equality between both sides of equation (4). In the ﬁrst
case, the ﬁscal authority adjusts its future spending and taxes so that they meet the
constraint for whatever value of the interest rate and the nominal income.
In the second case, the ﬁscal authority does not act in accordance with the satis-
faction of its budget constraint, so that pt must adjust to ensure the equilibrium. For
instance, at time 0, if future primary surpluses are set exogenously, and both initial
nominal debt obligations and real GDP are predetermined, the general price index is










According to Woodford (2001), the ex post satisfaction of the present value budget
constraint is obtained through a private net wealth eﬀect: following a change in the
sequence of future primary surpluses, due to expected lower taxes, households feel
wealthier and thus consume more, so that the price level increases until their real net
wealth returns to its initial level.
Needless to say, the FTPL poses a considerable challenge for existing theories of
price level determination. The FTPL produces a ”jumping general price level”, so
that formally the FTPL resembles the Quantity theory of Money. In fact, the FTPL
i sm e a n tt os u b s t i t u t et h eQ u a n t i t yt h e o r yo fm o n e yw i t haQ u a n t i t yt h e o r yo ft h e
Public Debt (Woodford, 1995). One motivation for this is that ﬁnancial innovations
1A third solution would consist for the government in selling additional long term debt, with
no change in future surpluses. This would devalue outstanding long term debt, hence raising future
inﬂation (Cochrane, 2001).
4have largely challenged the foundations of the Quantity theory of money. Indeed, the
transaction demand for money is very diﬃcult to delimit, and central banks may not
perfectly control a monetary aggregate.
In the alternative framework where central banks set short run nominal interest
rate according to a feedback rule, the FTPL places important restrictions on mone-
tary policy behaviour. Indeed, the determination of the price level depends on the
interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policies. First, if the government adjusts
its future primary surpluses to meet equation (4), the ﬁscal policy is called ’passive’
(see Leeper, 1991). Leeper (1991) showed that the economy is on a stable path if and
only if monetary policy is ’active’, i.e. the short run nominal interest rate over-reacts
to deviations of the inﬂation rate from its target. This ﬁrst regime is a regime with
a dominant monetary player (using the terminology of Canzoneri et al., 2001) or a
Ricardian regime (using the terminology of Aiyagari and Gertler, 1985). Second, if
the government does not adjust its future surpluses to meet equation (4), ﬁscal policy
is called ’active’. A locally-stable path for the economy then requires the implemen-
tation of a ’passive’ monetary policy, i.e. a reduction in the real interest rate after a
positive deviation of the inﬂation rate from its target to curb public debt growth. This
second regime is a regime with a ﬁscal dominant player or a non-Ricardian regime.
The FTPL holds in this latter case and the price level is able to jump.
These two economic regimes, ’Ricardian vs. non-Ricardian’, are at the heart of a
recent empirical controversy between Cochrane (1998) and Canzoneri et al. (2001).
Cochrane showed that the VAR analysis of the latter authors (see the following
sections for details), which provides ”evidence” of a negative correlation between
debt and surpluses (a Ricardian regime), may in fact hide a positive relationship, if
one can demonstrate that long term ﬁscal surpluses are negatively correlated with
cyclical ones and that the latter is less persistent than the former. This ”observational
equivalence” is striking, but Canzoneri et al. show that the correlation between the
two surpluses is very low in the US case and thus cannot hide a non-Ricardian regime.
W ed i s c u s st h i ss p e c i ﬁ cp o i n tl a t e ro n .
2.2 Alternative tests of the FTPL
Several alternative approaches can be considered for testing the FTPL. First, a
straightforward idea would be to use the price level as a left-hand side variable






However, this approach has been seldom implemented in the literature. One main
reason is that such an equation relies on the joint hypothesis of the FTPL and fully
ﬂexible prices. Woodford (1996) nonetheless showed that the FTPL could be consis-
tent with sticky prices (although not with sticky inﬂation, as argued by Creel and
Sterdyniak, 2001). In the case with sticky prices, the above equation does not hold
exactly. We thus did not pursue the idea of performing a direct test.
Most tests have focused on the behaviour of monetary and ﬁscal authorities.
Following the analysis by Leeper (1991), the behaviour of policymakers determines
whether the economy falls in a Ricardian or non-Ricardian regime. In particular,
as suggested by Woodford (1998), estimating monetary policy reaction functions
should reveal whether central banks behaviour is consistent with the FTPL. Leeper’s
characterisation of a ’passive’ monetary policy rule, consistent with the FTPL, is that
the so-called Taylor principle is violated, i.e. the inﬂation coeﬃcient in the interest
rate rule is inferior to unity. Evidence on monetary policies rules following Clarida
et al. (1998) suggests that the Taylor principle has been empirically observed in
most industrial countries, ruling out the FTPL. However, evidence is not deﬁnitive
for at least two reasons. First, the ﬁnding that the Taylor coeﬃcient is greater than
one might not be robust to the period (Clarida et al., 2000) or to the estimation
methodology (Woodford, 1998). Second, even if monetary policy is ’active’, ﬁscal
policy might still be ’active’ (hence might follow a non-Ricardian behaviour) resulting
in an unstable regime. In this situation, the ﬁscal behaviour clearly inﬂuences the price
level, though in a destabilising manner.
We therefore consider tests relying on the ﬁscal behaviour. Leeper (1991) and
Canzoneri et al. (2001) showed that a Ricardian regime is obtained as long as the
primary surplus responds positively to debt. This condition is in particular met if the
ﬁscal authority follows a ﬁscal reaction function of the following type:
st = αbt−1 + εt (5)
Such a feedback rule implies that equation (4) will hold for whatever level of
pt, hence that the regime is Ricardian. Hence, empirical evidence on ﬁscal feedback
6rules, such as the one provided by Bohn (1998), have been interpreted as a rejection
of the non-Ricardian regime, i.e. a rejection of the FTPL.
2.3 Fiscal policy and the FTPL: the controversy
Cochrane (1998, pp.340-1) has forcefully criticised this interpretation of feedback rules
and stated that the FTPL is subject to an ”observational equivalence” phenomenon.
Cochrane’s claim relies on the fact that an equation of the form (5) may hold as an
equilibrium relationship even in a non-Ricardian setting, and thus does not provide
conclusive evidence of a Ricardian regime.
Consider an exogenous autoregressive process for the surplus, which embodies a
typical non-Ricardian behaviour:
st = ρst−1 + vt
with 0 <ρ<1 and vt is i.i.d..
Then, in a non-Ricardian regime, the price level at time t − 1 will follow if, as
assumed, the real interest rate is constant:





Since Et−1st−1+j = ρj−1Et−1st , the following equality will hold
st = bt−1 ∗ (r − ρ) − vt
This latter equilibrium condition cannot be distinguished from a Ricardian feed-
back rule (5).
The VAR approach introduced by Canzoneri et al. (2001) can be considered
as an attempt to overcome this ”observational equivalence” problem. The approach
relies on the dynamic properties of the joint debt-surplus process rather than on a
single equation like (5). Canzoneri et al. observe that in a FTPL regime, the real
value of debt should increase following a rise in the surplus, at least if the surplus
series present some positive auto-correlation. They estimate a bivariate VAR model
using the surplus and debt series, and then study the properties of the impulse re-
sponse functions. They ﬁnd that after a positive surplus shock, the real value of debt
decreases. They thus conclude in favour of a Ricardian regime and reject the FTPL.
However, Cochrane (1998, pp.368-70) argued that an ”observational equivalence”
issue also applies to the Canzoneri et al. (2001) VAR approach. He proposes the
following example. Suppose that the observed surplus is the sum of two components:
7a cyclical component (at) and a structural component (zt) which respectively follow
AR processes:
at = ηaat−1 + εat (6)
zt = ηzzt−1 + εzt (7)
st = zt + at (8)
The structural balance component is assumed to be more persistent than the




βjst+j ,w h e r eβ = 1
r. Real debt shall therefore be positively correlated with
the sequence of future discounted primary surpluses.








Using Yt =( st,b t)￿,X t =( at,zt)￿, and putting together equations (6) to (9) into
a state-space system yields:






























An implied VAR representation for vector Yt =( st,bt)￿ is :
Yt = MAM−1Yt−1 + ut
with ut = Mεt.
If the innovations in the two components of the primary surplus are negatively
correlated (with E(εatεzt)=ρazσaσz < 0), then the innovations of the debt-surplus
process (st,b t)can also be negatively correlated, thus producing the appearance of a
Ricardian regime although a non-Ricardian regime is assumed to prevail A rationale
for the negative correlation is that after a decrease in the cyclical component of the
primary surplus, the government may tend to increase the structural component of
8the surplus. The persistence of the latter variable is high, so that, in ﬁne, real debt
increases because the present value of total surplus has increases. In such a case, a
positive shock on the surplus (a shock on u1t originating in a shock on εat)c a u s e st h e
real debt to decrease, a situation which Canzoneri et al. consider suﬃcient to reject
the non-Ricardian regime. One can therefore observe, at the same time, a negative
correlation between a shock on the surplus and real debt (a ”Ricardian” impulse
response function) and an equality between real debt and the sequence of future dis-
counted surpluses (a non-Ricardian regime). Cochrane’s (1998) critique thus suggests
that the methodology used by Canzoneri et al. (2001) should be supplemented with
the inclusion of cyclical and structural components of the primary surplus. For high
values (in absolute terms) of the negative correlation between the innovations in both
components, the observed negative correlation in the innovations of the debt-surplus
process might in fact hide a FTPL situation rather than its rejection.
The empirical approach followed in this paper, - it is described in the next sections
-, will hence build upon Canzoneri et al.’s methodology and take meanwhile into
account Cochrane’s critique.
3D a t a a n d m e t h o d s
This section presents the data we use as well the two steps we follow in the empirical
approach : ﬁrst, we estimate, respectively on French and US data, a bivariate debt-
surplus VAR model in the spirit of Canzoneri et al. (2001). Then we use structural
balance data to cope with Cochrane’s ”observational equivalence” argument.
3.1 Data
We use annual over the sample 1963-1999 (note that for the US the data are available
from 1957). All US series are taken from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO)
dataset. For France, the sources are the OECD and the INSEE (Institut National de
la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques). The output gap for France is available
in the OECD data only posterior to 1974. We have backcasted it using the HP ﬁlter,
which has proven a good approximation to the OECD indicator over the most recent
period. To compute a structural balance over the 1963-1973 period, we have used an
elasticity of 0.38 of the cyclical balance to the output gap, consistent with a linear
9regression of total government balance on structural balance and the output gap on
the available sample. The interest paid by the goverment over the whole sample
period are taken from various INSEE publications. Data are pictured in ﬁgures 1
and 2, and table A provides some summary statistics.
The FTPL implies that high public debt to GDP ratios should result from high
future discounted primary surpluses. High public deﬁcits (which raise nominal debt)
should either raise the price level or provoke the expectation of high future surpluses.
Looking at time series, it is therefore really diﬃcult to assess the capacity of a given
country to be in a non-Ricardian regime.
In the USA, for instance, although public deﬁcits tended to increase in the sixties-
seventies, the net public debt to GDP ratio decreased substantially until the mid-
seventies. This is not surprising in a period of high inﬂation with negative real interest
rates and mainly non-indexed debt. This might also be consistent with the FTPL.
Moreover, the public deﬁcit on GDP ratio seems to have always largely swung, with
a positive trend until the eighties. Every 4 to 5 years, public surpluses nonetheless
reemerged after the deﬁcit had reached a peak : in 1959, 1968, 1976, and 1983. These
peaks were generally due to external shocks: wars (Korea, Vietnam) or soaring oil
prices. These swungs in the public deﬁcits and the on-going rise in the public debt
to GDP ratio since 1974 might well be consistent with a FTPL regime: increases
in the deﬁcits have given rise to higher debt and oﬀsetting surpluses which satisﬁed
the government present value budget constraint. The latest large peak for public
deﬁcit could be attributed to discretionary expansionary ﬁscal policy: under the
Reagan administration, larger public expenditures in the defense sector, lower tax
rates and the increase in net interests had a major impulse on public deﬁcits. Since
the mid-eighties, this trend has been reversed, except during a short period (1989-93)
of economic turmoil. Under the Clinton administration, better economic conditions
and discretionary measures to curb the growth in public expenditures beneﬁt the
public surplus2. In the eighties, the Reagan deﬁcits and high real interest rates
fueled net debt. It soared to about 50% of GDP in the early 90s. In 1999, net debt
on GDP had come back to its level of 1964 and 1986. At ﬁrst sight, this ratio seems
rather stationary, implying the sustainability of US public ﬁnances, the latter element
being a necessary but insuﬃcient condition to be in a FTPL regime.
2On this topic, see the special issue in the FRB of New York Economic Policy Review, April 2000.
10Data for France are less volatile than for the US. Peaks and troughs are more
spaced in time. Still in comparison with the US, the trend towards higher deﬁcits has
been a very long process which has ended only in 1993, after a small improvement
and a stop during the late eighties. Lower deﬁcits seem to begin with during the
European convergence process, i.e. after the Maastricht Treaty. The situation of
French public ﬁnances is rather emblematic of the dramatic consequences of the real
interest jump in the early eighties. Until 1980, net public debt on GDP in France
was nil, even negative, although public ﬁnances were in deﬁcit until 1975. After
this year, this ratio never stopped increasing, with a very steep slope from 1980 to
1986 (real interest shock) as well as between 1992 and 1996 (economic slowdown).
In 1999, the ratio equalled almost 45% of the GDP. At ﬁrst sight, French public
debt to GDP ratio appears non-stationary. Adopting a FTPL view, the steep rise
in the public debt to GDP ratio until 1990 might hide the expectations of primary
surpluses. The convergence process with the limitations on public deﬁcit and the
adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact for countries in the Euro area hence could
have changed the expectations on future ﬁscal policies. Data for France clearly show
that the primary balance has been in surplus until 1996, which could be analysed as
a favourable trend for satisfying the government present value budget constraint.
3.2 Sustainability,the FTPL and the time series properties of ﬁscal
data
The FTPL has strong links with the issue of government solvency : the FTPL




pt+k )=0when k tends to the inﬁnity, which is assumed to hold under FTPL
( equation (4)). Note that .the reverse is not true: the sustainability condition is
consistent both with the FTPL hypothesis and with a Ricardian regime.
Sustainability implies some restrictions on the time series properties of debt and
deﬁcit, which have been discussed at length by the literature since Hamilton and
Flavin (1986). For instance, sustainability should imply that the overall (interest-
inclusive) deﬁcit is stationary. Furthermore, one restriction implied by the sustain-
ability hypothesis is that, if the government surplus process is non-stationnary, it
should be cointegrated with real debt (Trehan and Walsh, 1991). Bergman (2001)
notes that, insofar as the rate of time preference is strictly above zero, the sustainabil-
11ity of public ﬁnances is satisﬁed with government debt integrated of any ﬁnite order,
provided government revenue and expenditures are cointegrated. Fève and Hénin
(2000) deﬁne ”eﬀective sustainability” as real debt to GDP ratio being stationnary.
Empirical tests of government solvency have provided various results, with a ten-
dency to reject sustainability (see e.g. Roberts, 1991, for the US, and Jondeau 1992
for France). An intuition of these ﬁndings is provided by the result of ADF unit-root
tests reported in table A (lag number was selected using the AIC). The unit-root
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level for any of the series. In particular, non
stationarity of the interest-inclusive surplus points to non-sustainability. Note that
for France primary surplus, cyclical surplus and structural surplus are found to be
stationary at the 10% level. That cyclical surplus in the U.S. and in France (at the
5% level) are found to be non-stationnary is puzzling and may reﬂect the lack of
power of unit-root tests in small-sample (the number of observations is 36).
Rejection of sustainability should of course imply rejection of the FTPL. Here, we
adopt a favourable prior towards the FTPL, and follow the VAR in level approach
proposed by Canzoneri et al (2001), which assumes sustainability. One motivation for
this is the low power of unit root and cointegration tests in small samples. The main
motivation is that, as Canzoneri et al., we want to test the FTPL hypothesis versus
a Ricardian regime, both of which require sustainability. To discriminate between
these two hypotheses, we therefore focus on the short-run properties of the system,
as provided by the impulse-response functions, rather than on long-run properties.
In the FTPL, the government surplus is an exogenous forcing process (which may
be either stationary or non-stationary). Given that surplus shocks are plausibly
autocorrelated, and that in a non-Ricardian set-up the debt to nominal GDP ratio
can jump, we expect the response of debt to a surplus shock to be positive in a FTPL
regime.
3.3 Using cyclical and structural balance dynamics
In the second step of our empirical analysis, we use structural balance data to assess
whether the ﬁrst VAR results can be given an FTPL interpretation according to
Cochrane’s ”observational equivalence” argument. A ﬁrst test consists in estimating
whether structural and cyclical balance innovations are negatively correlated. This
has been showed to be required in Cochrane’s above example. Canzoneri et al. (2001)
12have veriﬁed that the innovations in US structural and cyclical components were
uncorrelated and have concluded that the FTPL could be rejected.
However, this test is quite rough since it relies only upon the contemporaneous
correlation between structural and cyclical balance. We propose to extend it to lagged
cross-correlations between those two series. Indeed, we consider a more general non-
diagonal A matrix in Cochrane’s example. Assume, as in the example above, that:

















βj(at+j +zt+j), the instantaneous impact on real debt of a shock to
cyclical balance can be written as:3
b∞ = eβA(I − βA)−1 ∗P ∗ e￿
1,
where e =( 1 ,1),e 1 =( 1 ,0) and P is the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance
matrix of εat and εzt.M a t r i xP is thus lower triangular (i.e., we recursively order the
shocks so that a shock on a m a yh a v ea ni m p a c to nz but the reverse is not true).
Depending on the coeﬃcients in matrices AandP, b∞ can be negative. In partic-
ular, even with uncorrelated contemporaneous innovations, the dynamic interactions
between the cyclical and the structural components might produce a negative re-
sponse of real debt following a positive surplus shock, even in a FTPL world.
This test with lagged cross-correlations can be implemented empirically estimat-
ing a 2-variable VAR with structural balance and cyclical balance.
4 Empirical results
4.1 A bivariate Debt-Surplus VAR
We ﬁrst estimate a bivariate Surplus-Debt VAR model over the period 1964-1999
respectively for France and the USA4. Estimation results are given in table B.
3We use Et(at+k + zt+k)=eA
kXt
4While series are available for a longer span in the case of the US, this sample period has been
chosen so as to be similar for both countries.
13In the US case, we replicate the analysis of Canzoneri et al. (2001) with only
4 more years of data. The main diﬀerence with their study is that, due to the
i n c l u s i o no ft h em o s tr e c e n ty e a r s ,a2l a gV A Ri sn e e d e dr a t h e rt h a na1l a gV A R .
Impulse response functions for the surplus shock, with the surplus shock ordered
ﬁrst, are pictured in ﬁgure 3. For the US, they are very similar to those obtained
by Canzoneri et al.. A positive shock on the surplus provokes a decrease in public
debt. Note that this result is robust to the ordering of the VAR.
For France, we estimate a VAR with a single lag, as supported by LR tests
(LR statistic for 1 lag against 2 lags is 2.73 with a p-value of 0.396 from the χ2(4)
distribution). This lag length is supported both by the Akaike and the BIC criteria.
The main result from the impulse response functions is that, as in the US case,
the debt decreases after a positive surplus shock has occurred. Conﬁdence intervals
indicate that this decrease is statistically signiﬁcant at least for 10 years. This pattern
is consistent with a Ricardian interpretation: favourable ﬁscal shocks helps reducing
government debt. Note that the ﬁnding is robust to the ordering of the VAR and to
the inclusion of additionnal lags in the VAR model5.
4.2 Incorporating structural balance data
We now incorporate structural primary balance data into the analysis.
4.2.1 The structural and cyclical balances as AR processes
First, we model the structural and cyclical balances as AR processes. Results are
reported in table C.
In the case of France, we obtained an AR(1) model for the structural primary
surplus. The autoregressive term is 0.60. The cyclical balance can be modelled either
as an AR(2) model, with autoregressive parameters of 0.92 and -0.28 respectively for
the ﬁrst and second lags, or as an AR(1) model, with parameter 0.71. A ﬁrst important
ﬁnding of this univariate analysis is that, contrary to the intuition, the cyclical balance
is more persistent than the structural balance. Furthermore, the innovations for the
two AR processes appear to be uncorrelated (correlation coeﬃcient is ρ = −0.02).
Both elements point against the FTPL interpretation of the data.
5These latter results are available from the authors upon request.
14For the US, one lag is enough to model the structural balance (whose autore-
gressive parameter is equal to 0.69) and the cyclical balance (whose autoregressive
parameter is equal to 0.79). Contrary to the result reported in Canzoneri et al.
(2001), and although we share the same source for the data, the cyclical component
of the primary surplus is, like for France, more persistent than the structural surplus
process. The diﬀerence between our results and Canzoneri et al’s results regarding
this speciﬁc topic may be due to the fact that the latter authors do not actually
use structural primary surpluses but interest-inclusive structural surpluses. Indeed,
they report using ”standardized-employment” ﬁgures from the CBO which are not
based, as far as we know, on the net-of-interest public deﬁcit6.T oo b t a i nt h es t r u c -
tural primary surplus, we took the interest-inclusive structural ﬁgures (a positive sign
represents a net asset) and added the net interests (a positive sign represents a net
liability), where both series come from the CBO database. At last, we give evidence
that the innovations in the cyclical and structural components of the primary surplus
are uncorrelated (ρ = −0.03).
4.2.2 A 2-variable VAR including the cyclical and the structural primary
balance
In light of the normative example given in section 3.1 above, we investigate for the
relevance of Cochrane’s observational equivalence argument as applied to the preced-
ing evidence. We follow a two-step approach. First, we estimate a VAR with the
cyclical and the structural balance. Second, we compute the change in the value of
the debt when there is a shock on the cyclical surplus, assuming the FTPL hypothesis
holds (the ordering for the VAR is such that the cyclical surplus comes ﬁrst). We
compute the afore-mentioned formula: b∞ = eβA(I − βA)−1 ∗ P ∗ e￿
1.R e c a l lt h a ti f
b∞ is negative, a ”Cochrane eﬀect” is present and the FTPL cannot be rejected on
grounds that the contemporaneous innovations in the cyclical and structural compo-
nents of the primary surplus are uncorrelated. In the computation β was set equal
to 0.99,consistent with the interpretation of this parameter as a growth-corrected
interest rate.
6Using US structural interest-inclusive and cyclical surpluses, on the sample 1957-1995 (the be-
ginning year is the ﬁrst available for the structural balance in the CBOdataset - the end-of-sample
year is taken from Canzoneri et al.), we checked that the structural component is very slightly more
persistent (AR component equal to 0.687) that the cyclical one (0.685).
15VAR results are reported in table D. We selected a 1-lag VAR for both countries,
which is supported by the BIC. Note that for the US a 2 lag VAR, which is also
consistent with the data and is selected by the AIC and LR test, provides similar
results For both countries, the correlation between innovations εat and εzt is non-
signiﬁcant (ρUS = −0.02 and ρFrance =0 .07), so that the ordering of shocks is of low
importancel. In the US case the lagged cyclical surplus appears with a positive sign
in the structural surplus equation. As a result, introducing structural surplus into
the analysis does not help creating negative long run autocorrelation in the overall
surplus. Assuming a Non-Ricardian regime, we ﬁnd b∞=2.88, so that the FTPL
should be manifest in the response functions. Allowing for a 2 lag VAR provides an
even higher value for b∞ : b∞=6.04.
For France, the lagged cyclical surplus appears with a negative sign b∞=-0.18.
At face value, this result indicate that we may observe a Ricardian impulse response
function even if a Non-Ricardian regime prevails. However the parameter value is very
weak. Moreover, this parameter is not stable across time. Figure 4 reports recursive
computation of b∞(binf) and the residual correlation, following recursive estimation
of the VAR parameters.
On the whole, the actual structural-cyclical balance dynamics provide low support
to a FTPL interpretation of the surplus-debt impulse response function.
4.2.3 A 3-variable VAR including the debt, the cyclical and the struc-
tural primary balance
Last, we estimate a VAR including the public debt, the cyclical and the structural
balance. This is an unrestricted version of Canzoneri et al. (2001) test as well as
an unrestricted version of the tests performed and presented above: here, a FTPL
regime is not assumed and we rather investigate the dynamic properties on debt of a
shock on the primary surplus, via impulse reaction functions.
With French data, we still compute a one-lag VAR whereas, in the US case, two
lags are necessary according to the LR test. Results are threefold. First, for both
countries, estimation results for the VAR process are such that public debt is never
a signiﬁcant determinant for either the cyclical or the structural component of the
primary surplus. This may somewhat dampen the resort to feedback policy rules
to invalidate the FTPL. Second, whether the cyclical or the structural surplus are
16raised, the public debt to GDP ratio always falls (see ﬁgure 5 reporting impulse
response functions for both surplus shocks). As in section 4.1 the IRFs have a more
p l a u s i b l ei n t e r p r e t a t i o ni naR i c a r d i a ns e t - u pt h a ni naF T P Lw o r l d . L a s t ,t h e s e
impulse response functions are robust to the sample period. Although a rise in the
US structural primary surplus tends to increase public debt in the long run, when
using a shorter sample, this debt rise is not statistically signiﬁcant.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between public debts and deﬁcits
with a concern for the ﬁscal theory of the price level. More speciﬁcally, we questioned
the empirical plausibility of the FTPL in France and in the USA. We gave much
attention to the ”observational equivalence” argument developed by Cochrane (1998).
This arguments points that a negative response of public debt to GDP ratio after
a positive shock on the primary surplus can be observed even in a so-called non-
Ricardian regime (or FTPL regime).
Our results show that the impulse response function of a VAR model, either a
two- or three-variable VAR, either with the primary surplus or with its two separate
components (cyclical and structural), are always consistent with the benchmark re-
sults by Canzoneri et al. (2001). The FTPL hypothesis should thus be viewed as
non-plausible for France and the USA. Furthermore, taking into account Cochrane’s
critique through the introduction of cyclical and structural primary surplus dynamics
does not allow to provide a FTPL interpretation to previous results.
This study has focused only on ﬁscal data and is suject to several limitations.
First, the analysis has been conducted under the implicit assumption of constant
expected discount rate. Allowing for a time-varying discount rate may provide some
support to an FTPL interpretation of the data. Second, the approach supposes very
ﬂexible prices. A remaining question is thus what are the empirical implications of
t h eF T P Li nas t i c k y - p r i c ee n v i r o n m e n t .
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19Table A : Summary statistics
Sample
mean St. Dev. Min Max ADF t-stat. Lags
France
Primary Surplus 0,25 1,06 -2,38 2,13 -2,75 * 1
Debt 10,65 14,85 -3,35 43,20 1,04 1
Overall surplus -1,84 1,84 -6,00 0,93 -1,82 1
Primary structural surplus 0,46 0,90 -1,42 2,07 -2,70 * 1
Cyclical surplus -0,21 0,57 -1,05 1,06 -2,64 * 1
The US
Primary Surplus -0,18 1,63 -3,43 3,88 -1,56 1
Debt 35,57 8,37 23,86 49,49 -1,67 1
Overall surplus -2,41 1,83 -6,04 1,36 -1,67 1
Primary structural surplus 0,49 1,11 -2,06 2,50 -2,47 1
Cyclical surplus -0,67 1,21 -3,08 1,38 -2,00 1
Note : ratio over GDP, percentage point. Sample period 1964-1999
Lag lenght for ADF test selected according to AIC.
'*' indicate rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 10% critical level.TABLE B : VAR estimates Primary Surplus-Debt
Sample : 1964-1999
France The US
SP DD SP DD
SP(-1) 0,64 -0,93 SP(-1) 0,27 0,84
0,15 0,34 0,34 0,50
SP(-2) SP(-2) 0,03 -0,33
0,18 0,27
DD(-1) 0,00 1,03 DD(-1) -0,22 1,99
0,01 0,03 0,19 0,29
DD(-2) DD(-2) 0,31 -1,09
0,21 0,31
Constant 0,08 1,11 Constant -3,21 3,61
0,19 0,43 1,11 1,65
Adj. R-squared 0,34 0,98 0,57 0,96
s.e. equation 0,86 1,96 1,07 1,60
AIC 2,62 4,27 3,11 3,91
SC 2,75 4,40 3,33 4,13
System
Residual correlation -0,62 -0,87
Log Likelihood -109,22 -90,83
Akaike Information Criteria 6,40 5,60
Schwarz Criteria 6,66 6,04
Note : SP : Primary surplus, DD Debt, Standard errors in italicsTable C: AR processes for cyclical and primary structural surpluses
Sample: 1964 1999
France
Dependent Variable: SSP (zt)





Akaike info criterion 2,285
Schwarz criterion 2,373
Dependent Variable: SC (at)






Akaike info criterion 1,053
Schwarz criterion 1,186
Corr. of innovation SC,SSP1 -0,017
The US
Dependent Variable: SSP (zt)





Akaike info criterion 2,562
Schwarz criterion 2,650
Dependent Variable: SC (at)





Akaike info criterion 2,424
Schwarz criterion 2,512
Corr. of innovation SC,SSP -0,026
Note : SC cyclical surplus, SSP primary structural surplusTABLE D: VAR estimates Cyclical Surplus-Primary Structural Surplus
Sample : 1964-1999
France The US
Dependent var.: SC SSP SC SSP
SC(-1) 0,71 -0,35 0,78 0,19
0,12 0,21 0,11 0,12
SSP(-1) 0,12 0,60 -0,18 0,71
0,07 0,14 0,13 0,13
C -0,11 0,12 -0,03 0,31
0,08 0,14 0,16 0,17
Adj. R-squared 0,52 0,36 0,58 0,44
S.E. equation 0,39 0,72 0,78 0,83
AIC 1,05 2,26 2,42 2,54
SC 1,18 2,40 2,55 2,68
System
Residual correlation 0,07 -0,02
binf -0,18 2,88
Log Likelihood -53,60 -83,36
AIC 3,31 4,96
SC 3,57 5,23
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Response of DD to SSP
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.